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RECENT CASES
Actions-Attachment of Frozen Funds as Conferring Jurisdiction
in Rem-A New York corporation commenced an action against a
Rumanian bank for conversion of gold bullion ' by securing and levying a
warrant of attachment against funds of the defendant that are on deposit
with various New York banks. Defendant appeared specially and moved
to vacate said attachment on the grounds that the Executive Order freezing
property of Rumanian nationals in this country 2 so far immobilized its
deposits with the New York banks as to make them unattachable in the

absence of a lifting license from the Secretary of the Treasury. Held,
(three judges dissenting) motion denied. The "seizure subject to license"
was sufficient for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction over the deposits
in question. Commission for Polish Relief, Ltd. v. Banca Nalionala a
Runtaniei,s 288 N. Y. 332, 43 N. E. (2d) 345 (1942).
The device of foreign attachment is a provisional remedy designed to
offer relief in various situations.' In the instant case it was employed as a
substitute for personal service in an action against a non-resident defendant.
A prerequisite to such procedure in ren is the presence within the particular jurisdicdion of property that is subject to attachment. s The attachment

i. The gist of plaintiff's complaint is as follows: In October, 1939, a Polish bank
placed gold bars worth some three million dollars in the defendant bank for safekeeping. In April, ig4o, the Polish bank assigned its rights to the Polish Food Commission. The latter demanded delivery of the gold, which was refused, in May, 1940.
Subsequently the Food Commission assigned it cause of action to the plaintiff, and this
suit was instituted in December, i94o.
2. Ex. Order No. 8389, April 1o, 194o, 5 Fm. REG. 1400 (1940), as amended, Ex.
Order No. 8565, Oct. 1o, 1940, 5 Fm. REG. 4o62 (940), 12 U. S. C. A. § 95 note (App.
1941). A more current revision of the freezing orders appears in 6 FE. REG. 2897
(194-). For helpful discussions of the mechanics of the orders see Binder, Practical
Aspects of Foreign Property Control (Ig4i) xg N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. i and Note
(x940 41 COL. L. REV. 1o39. Their international ramifications are discussed by Freutel, Exchange Control, Freezing Orders and the Conflict of Laws (1942) 56 HARV. L.
REV. 3o.
3. The decisions of the lower courts are reported in 262 App. Div. 543, 3o N. Y.
S. (2d) 69o (2d Dep't, 194) and 176 Misc. 1o7, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) x89 (Sup. Ct.
1941). A motion to vacate the iarrant of attachment on other grounds was denied in
176 Misc. 1o64, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 377 (Sup. Ct. 1941). Dicta in these lower court opinions were modified by the instant case. See note 9 infra.
4. In New York, if a plaintiff states a cause of action for the recovery of a sum
of money only, he is entitled to a warrant of attachment against property of the defendant within the state where the defendant: (x) is a non-resident or a foreign corporation; (2) is about to or has departed from the state, or is concealing himself
therein, with intent to defraud creditors or avoid service; (3) has removed or is about
to remove property from the state for a like purpose; (4) has made a false statement
as to his financial condition for the purpose of procuring credit; (5) is being sued for
damages to property sustained because of reliance on such false statement; (6)" has
been guilty of a fraud in making an express or implied contract; or (7) is an adult
absent from the state for six months without designating an agent to receive service.
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT (Thompson, Supp. 1942) §§ 902, 903.
5. Pennoyer v. Neff. 95 U. S. 714 (1877) ; Douglass v. PhenLx Ins. Co., r38 N. Y.
209, 33 N. E. 938 (1893).
At least three general tests have been applied to determine whether attachable
property exists: (x) Is there a res subject to levy and sale on execution? Goode v.
Longmire, 35 Ala. 668 (i86o) ; (2) Is there a res which the owner himself might sell?
Lanahan v. Bailey, 53 S. C. 489, 31 S. E. 332 (I88) ; (3) Has the court secured any
dispositive dominion over any res by virtue of the levy? Pennoyer v. Neff. supra.
In fairness to the dissenters in the instant case, it should be pointed out that none
of these tests are complied with; absent a license, no transfer of any kind may be
made. See note 8 infra. Moreover, there is a strong analogy between frozen property
(26o)
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serves two purposes: one is jurisdictional; and the second, security.*

Though at no place articulately stated in either opinion, the conflict between
the majority of the court and those who dissented from the instant holding
presents itself in their answers to the question of whether an attachment
can be made for the jurisdictional purpose, even though it be ineffective
to give any present lien.? It is conceded that no interest, not even that of
lienor,3 can be acquired in the property of a blocked national without license
from the Treasury. However, the prohibitions of the Executive Order are
designed to prevent completed transfers of property and interests therein
without governmental supervision--mainly to keep the property from the
grasp of an enemy power? In this light the position of the majority seems
sound. By permitting the attachment to confer jurisdiction, the issue as to
the alleged conversion is left to the state cnurt 10 and does not fall to the

and property in custodia legis, which is universally immune from attachment. Morris
v. Penniman, 14 Gray 220 (Mass. 1859) (money taken from a prisoner); Pugh Y.

Jones,
6.
16 ST.
7.
can be

(money in hands of a guardian).
See Prashker, New York's Attachment Statutes-The Revision of ,941 (x941)
JoHN's L REv. 53, 5Said the majority: .For all we know, payment . . . to the credit of this action
The lien of an attachment is always hypothetical in some depermitted. ...
134 Iowa 746, 112 N. W. 225 (1907)

gree. A 'seizure subject to license was, we think, sufficient for the purpose of jurisdiction... ." Instant case, 288 N. Y. at 338. 43 N. E. (2d) at 34.
Compare the following language of the dissent: "What the plaintiff is eking here
is a res sufficiently illusory not to fall within the all-inclusive prohibition of the Execative Order and at the same time to be sufficiently substantial to afford a basis for
jurisdiction. In our opinion such inconsistency seeks the impossible." Instant case,
288 N. Y. at 34r, 43 N. E. (2d) at 349.
& Section x of the Executive Order provides in part: ".. . the following tra sactions are prohibited . . . if . . . (ii) such transactions involve property in which
any foreign country designated in this Order, or any national thereof, has . . . any
interest . . . E. All transfers, withdrawals or exportations of, or dealings in, a "evdences of indebtedness or evidence of ownership of property by any person within the
United States... ." 5 FE. REG. 1400 (i94o), as amended by 5 F.. Rn. 1677
(1940) and 6 FED. Ru. 2897 (1941).
(i) The
Treasury Department General Ruling No. 12 provides in part: t.
term 'transfer' shall mean . . . the creation or transfer of any lien; the issuance,
docketing, filing, or the levy of or under any judgment, decree, attachmnt, execution,
or other judicial or administrative process or order, or the service of any garnishment; . . ." 7 FED. REG. 2991 (1942).
General Ruling No. 12 was before the court in the instant case, though not men-

tioaed in either opinion. See Freutel, loc. cit. supra note 2, at 67. The ruling, though
issued as recently as April 21, 1942, was intended to apply to "any transfer after the
effective date of the Order".
9. See debate on the act passed to retroactively invalidate the Order, reported 86
Co'nc. REc. 5007 (1940). There are other reasons: e. g., to facilitate the use of the
preserve our barblocked assets in the war effort, to protect American creditors, to intact
for its owngaining position in post-war negotiations, to keep "refugee capital"
ers in conquered nations. See Binder, loc. cit. supra note 2, at x-5; Freutel, I". cit.
supra note 2, at 30-36.
There were dicta in the lower court opinions to the effect that assignments could
of Treasury approvaL
be made that would carry the title to these funds regardless
Because this might open the way to foreign assignments that would operate counter to
the purposes of the Order, the Treasury filed a brief as amicus curiae iq the instant
case,
appeal, and these dicta were disapproved. For a discussion of this aspect of the
see Freutel, loc. cit. supra note 2, at 64-71.
83 (Sup.
1o. Cf. Bollack v. Societe Generale etc., 177 Misc. 136, 30 N. y- S. (ad)
Dep't, 1942) (The
Ct. x94t), reversed, 263 App. Div. 6o, 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 986 (ist
it is a good
holding below was that where title to certain frozen securities is at issue,
pointed
defense to plead the Executive Order. In reversing, the Appellate Division
out that a license would be a prerequisite to execution on any judgment that might be
&
given, but was not a requirement for instituting suit.) ; see also Brown v. Morgan
in aid of attachCo- Inc.. 177 Misc. 626, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 323 (Sup. Ct. i94r)to (action
freezing but no attempt
ment: Executive Order no defense where levy made prior
made to comply therewith).
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Treasury as it would to some extent were a license required as a prerequisite to suit."' Moreover, since Treasury officials determine whether
any lien is to be afforded a particular plaintiff by granting or refusing him
a license after judgment, 2 the mandate of the recent Pink case 13 is obeyed
and the determination of our foreign policy is left with the Federal government.
Contracts-Recovery of Money Paid on Contract Where Perfornance Impossible-Plaintiff

contracted with defendant in July,

x939, for delivery c. i. f. of certain machinery to Glydnia, partial payment
accompanying the order. In September, 1939, Germany occupied Glydnia,
so delivery could not take place.

Plaintiff seeks return of the money paid

down, and apkAs from an adverse judgment in the Court of Appeal
Held, judgment reversed. The money paid down is recoverable on the
common count of indebitatus as money had and received, since there was a

total lack of consideration. FibrosaSpolka Akeyjna v. Fairbairn,Lawson,
Combe, Barbour, Ltd., 194 L. T. 5 (i942) -s
Frustration in English law means absolute impossibility of performance, rather than impractically or hardship.' The general rule has been,
in England, that in cases of frustration the loss lies where it falls. The
reason for this rule is the impossibility of adjusting or ascertaining the
rights of the parties with exactitude. Therefore, the law treats everything
already done in pursuance of the contract as validly done, but relieves the
ii. At an earlier stage of the instant suit applications for licenses to transfer the.
attached deposits to the name of the sheriff for the account of the action were
denied. See 26a App. Div. 543, 546, 3o N. Y. S. (2d) 69o, 693 (2d Dep't, 194).
If this is indicative of a general Treasury policy, its practical effect is either (i) to
deny all action in rem where the res is frozen property, or (2) to deny such actions
whenever the Treasury feels the claim is of questionable merit or the claimant is aperson whose success would be in conflict with the national interest. Yet, in war time,
in rem actions are in most instances the only practical means by which relief can be
obtained in cases of claims against foreigners, enemy or otherwise. And the existence
of war seems no reason for denying our own citizens acesss to our own courts,
Of course, where the property in question has been placed in the hands of the
Alien Property Custodian (Ec. Order No. 9T4, April 21, 1942, 7 FE. Rmn 2985) it
is subject to the rules laid down in the Trading with the Enemy Act. 40 STAT. 41t
(1917). So U. S. C. A. app. § i et seq. (1928). In this connection the subsequent history of Brown v. Morgan & Co., Inc., cited note ii supra, is interesting. See id., 177
Misc. 763.31 N. Y. S. (2d) 8iS (Sup. Ct. 1g41) (judgment on former hearing modified due to declaration of war on Italy).
x2. Evidently such licenses will be granted when it will not offend national policy
to doso. See instant case, 288 N. Y. at 3A 43 N..
(2d ) at 348, where it is stated:
.. . . the government . . . informs us . . . that the levies . . . do not offend any

national policy..
(indicating that the court was under the impression that a license
would issue).
x3. United States V. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (x942), go U. or PA. L. REv. 74r.
x. (94i)

57 T. L. P.547. For critical discussions of the decision in the lower
REv. 27, 57 L Q. Rv. 439, 57 S

court, see (1941) i5 AusT. LJ. x87, 33 JURI.

I- R~v. 134.
2. A clause in the contract provided for a reasonable extension of time if "despatch be hindered or delayed by . . . any cause beyond our reasonable control including . . . war". The court dismissed the argument that this clause contemplated the
war and provided for suspension of the contract, thus preventing frustration, because
of its limited ambit.
3. Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick, Kerr & Co. [i9181 A. C. xig; Horlock v.
Beal, 119161 i A. C. 486; Tamplin Steamship Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co-. 119161 2 A. C. 397; Hall v. Wright (i859) E. B. & E. 746. Wade, The
Principrleof Impossibility in Contract (194o) 56 L Q. REv. 519; McNair, Frustra6ow
of Constract by 1liar (1O4O) 56 L Q. REv. 173; McNair, War-Time Impossibuity of
Performoxce of Contract (1919) 35 L. Q. REv. 84.
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parties of further responsibility.' Underlying this are the various concepts
of the interdependence of conditions in contracts. These concepts gradually developed from Pordagev. Cole.5 Later cases modified this rule, and
conditions in contracts came to be considered mutually interdependent. 6
In applying these concepts to those cases where frustration enters, the
courts applied the strict rule to all already accomplished before the impossibility became apparent, excusing any further performance." In cases
where money, time and labor has been expended in furtherance of the contract obligations, the impracticality of adjusting these expenses prevents
any restitution, justifying the general rule. But where, as here, money
has been paid in part payment for the articles which are excused from
delivery, the reason for the rule falls, and hence the rule should not govern. There is now no difficulty in measuring the amount. A condition of
the payment should be implied that it is final only on delivery of the goods.8
This is the view taken by the court in the instant case, in .reversing the
earlier decisions, and seems far more equitable in result than the older
view. The basis of the decision as pointed out by court, was for money
had and received. Since there was a total failure of consideration, a restitutionary right arises in the plaintiff to recover the money paid down.
The instant decision brings English law in accord with American law on
this point, although the English rule for frustration is still more strict than
the American s
Contracts-Retailer Protected Where 0. P. A. Order Froze His
Prices Below Level Fixed by Resale Price Maintenance ContractPlaintiff, a retail druggist, seeks an injunction pendente lite to restrain the
sale of merchandise at prices below the minimum level set in a price--ffin-g
agreement made pursuant to the Fair Trade Law of New York., The
defendant, a competing retail druggist, alleges that his prices have been
"frozen", under the Federal Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,2 below
the minimum level prescribed by the price-fixing agreement and that he
is therefore unable to raise his prices to that minimum level. An 0. P. A.
release 'provides that a person in such a dilemma may apply for an adjust4. Chandler v. Webster, [19o4] 1 K. B. 493 (overruled by the instant case),
wherein plaintiff had hired a room on the route of the coronation, having paid the
price therefor in advance, and was denied a return of the money paid on the subsequent
abandonment of the coronation due to the King's illness. Appleby v. Myers, [18771
L. R. 2 C. P. 651o McNair, War-Time Impossibility of Performance of Contrac
(1919) 35 L. Q. REy. 84, 86.

5. (1607) 1 Wins. Saunders 319 (x), as cited in (1941) 56 L. Q. Ray. 540. This

case established the strict pre.sumption that all promises were independent and not

each conditional on the other. Serjeant Williams later revived this old presumption,
and it has borne much weight throughout the history of both English and American
contract law. See 3 WILUSTON, CONTacATS (rev. ed. 1936) § 819.
6. See WLLSTON, id., §§ 813 to 838, especially §§ 8xg to 831.
7. See cases cited note 4 supra.
8. See WILLSTrox, op. cit. supra note s, at 1 835.
9. See footnote 3. RESTATEMENT, COT.Acrs (1932) § 454. See also'Wmsoic,
op. cit. supra note 5, at §§ 813 to 838; McNair, loc. cit. supra note 4.
I. 19 N. Y. Co,'s. LAWS (McKinney, 1941) § 369 (a) and (b). Price-fixing of
certain commo lities is permitted, and injunctive relief is authorized for benefit of injured competitors of a violator.
2. 56 STAT. 23, 50 U. S. C. A. § 9o et seq. (Supp. 1942). Pursuant to Section
2 (a) of the Act, the Administrator, on April i8, 1942, issued a General Maximum
Price Regulation Bulletin, to be effective May 18, i942, which, in substance, enjoined

retailers from selling merchandise at prices higher than those obtained in the month of
March, 1942. The defendant during March had been selling at prices below the level
of the price-fixing agreement and the price regulation froze him at those lower prices.
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ment of his ceiling price." The defendant had not done this. Held, that
the injunction pcndcnte life should not issue. Schrcicr ct al. v. Siegel, 36
N. Y. S. (2d) 97 (Sup Ct., 1942).

Where performance of a contract is prevented or prohibited by a stat-

ute passed after the formation of the contract, the situation is treated by

the courts as a problem of impossibility." The instant court interpreted
Section 205 (d) of the Emergency Price Control Act 5 to protect those who
in good faith abide by the statute and regulations promulgated thereunder. s
Under this interpretation the general law of impossibility is not applicablethe problem is one of the meaning of "good faith" compliance. And the

instant court concluded that it was not necessary for the defendant to apply
for an adjustment of his ceiling for his compliance to be in good faith.' A
better interpretation of Section 2o5 (d) would seem to be that it affords
protection only to persons complying with those provisions, regulations,

etc. which are subsequently modified, rescinded, or determined to be invalid; that the phrase beginning "notwithstanding" restricts the application of the preceding clause. Assuming this latter interpretation, the problem then resolves into one of the general doctrine of impossibility.' It is
apparent, however, that the Federal Act does not render impossible, nor
does it prohibit, compliance with the price-fixing agreement. The alternative remains to the defendant to sell none of the affected merchandise. The
case might arise in which, for the retailer to sell none of the merchandise
might cause such loss as to make that course an "impossibility".' The
3.0. P. A. Release of May 22, z942: "Where a retailer is 'frozen' at a maximum
price which forces him to sell below the minimum price set in a fair trade agreement
that was in effect in March, he may apply under Section x8 (a) of the Regulation for
an adjustment of his ceiling on the ground that it is abnormally low in relation to the
maximum prices of the same or similar commodities established . . . for other sellers
at retail."
4. 6 WILusToN, Co
TACTs (Rev. ed. 1938) § 1938, p. 5427; RESTATEMENT, CO TRAcTs (1932) § 458; cf. id., § 6o8. See cases cited in 6 WiLVusTox, CoN.TmcTs § t938,
S. "No person shall be held liable for damages or penalties . . . for or in respect

of anything done . . . in good faith pursuant to any provision of this Act or any regution, order, price schedule, requirement, or agreement thereunder . . . notwithstanding that subsequently such provision, regulation, order, price schedule, requirement, or
agreement may be modified, reicinded, or determined to be invalid."
6. Instant case at 102, 10h
7. Instant case at 104. This conclusion would seem open to considerable question.

The effect of the decision is that the exculpatory clause operates to protect defendant's
subsequent violations of the price maintenance contract if he elects not to apply for an
adjustment. Such a result should be avoided if possible and here that could easily be
done. "Good faith compliance" is an extremely elastic concept and could well be construed to'require a bona fide effort to remove the restraint of the low-price ceilingL e., to impose the same requirement as exists under the law of impossibility (see note
ri infra).
8. The writer is unable to find any cases concerning impossibility as an excuse for
the breach of negative covenants. The principles applied to positive covenants would
for the most part be equally applicable to negative covenants. Concerning impossibility
due to change in law, see RE.sTATEmENT, Co-;TRAcrs (1932) § 458; 6 ,ViLusmON, CoxrTRACTS §§ 1938, 1939.
9. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §454: "In the Restatement of this Subject

impossibility means not only strict impossibility but impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss involved.' See 6 VILLs'To.v,
CONTRACTS § 1963. It should be observed that the only direct loss or injury here involved would be the failure to realize unanticipated profits from the sale of the merchandise. It is extremely questionable whether such a "loss" is contemplated as within
this definition. The resulting loss of other business (where, for example, the merchandisc involved was used as a loss leader) would be a failure to realize anticipated profits
and also an indirect loss at best, which would make such loss doubly questionable.
This problem illustrates a difficulty in the fact of the negative covenant in this case.
The cases on the subject have dealt with loss or difficulty involved in an affirmative
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problem would then arise whether the fact that defendant's prior breach
of the contract contributed to the impossibility, should prevent the impossibility from being an excuse."0 Even assuming that defendant's inability to
sell at the contract price without violating the 0. P. A. regulation would
constitute impossibility and that that excuse were available to the defendant, he should be required to apply for an adjustment of his ceiling before
being excused on grounds of impossibility. Authority requires that the
contracting party make a diligent effort to avoid the prohibition or impossibility."'
Labor Law-Enforcement of Contract Providing That State
Agency Arbitrate Dispute Between Union and Company Manufacturing War Materials-On April i6, 1942, the defendant, a company
manufacturing war materials, and the petitioning union entered .into an
agreement for future arbitration by the New York Board of Mediation
of unsettled differences arising from a wage-hour dispute. The defendant
company refused to proceed with the arbitration, asserting that the National War Labor Board 1 has jurisdiction over the dispute. Held,
petition for an order of compliance with the contract to arbitrate denied.
The war policy of the federal government conflicts with and supersedes
state procedure for the enforcement of the arbitration contract. liaernational Association of Machinists v. E. C. Stearns & Co., 36 N. Y. S. (2d)

156 (Sup. Ct.

1942).

That section of the New York Civil Practice Act providing for the
enforcement of contracts for arbitration permits such defenses as exst at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.2 The court in the instant case has found the jurisdiction of the National War Labor Board
over this dispute to be a valid equitable defenses to an action brought
under that Act.' This result was reached despite the fact that the Execact of performance, and the Restatement was clearly drawn up with that situation in
mind. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 454, comments a, b; id., EXPLANATORY

NOTES (Proposed Final Draft No. 11, 1932) §454.
zo. Cf. Moha v. Hudson Boxing Club, 164 Wis. 425, i6o N. W. 266 (19t6); Rz458, illus. 5.
STATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932)
ii. Murphy v. North American Co. et at., 24 F. Supp. 57 (S. D. N. Y. 1938);
Cheatham v. Wheeling & L. E. Ry., 37 F. (2d) '593 (S.D. N. Y. 1930) ; Peckham v.
Industrial Securities Co., 31 Del. 200, 113 Atl. 799 (Super. Ct. 1921); Brown v. J. P.
Morgan & Co., 177 N. Y. Misc. 626, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 323 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; REsTATz7MENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 458, illus. 3.

x. Note that the National War Labor Board had been in existence three months
at the time of the agreement to arbitrate was made. It was established by the President by Executive Order 9017, dated January 12, 1942. 7 FED. Rwa. 237 (1942).

2. "Except as otherwise prescribed in this section, two or more persons may submit to-the arbitration of one or more arbitrators any controversy existing between
them at the time of the submission, which may be the subject of an action, or they
may contract to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter *arising between them
and such submission or contract shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT (Thompson, Supp. 1941) Art. 84, § x448.
3. Under the relevant section of the Civil Practice Act, quoted note 2 supra, only
such defenses as concern revocation of a contract are allowed. But it is difficult to
see why the court talks in terms of a defense of revocation, for it would seem that if
the court's reasoning is followed to its logical conclusion the contract was void in the
first instance. This would result from the fact that the contract was made after the
establishment of the National War Labor Board, not before.
4. Section 1450 of the Civil Practice Act provides that in the absence of a substantial issue as to the making or failure to comply with the contract, an order shall
be made directing the parties to proceed to the arbitration provided for in the contract.
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT (Thompson, Supp. 1941) Art. 84, § 1450.
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utive Order establishing the National War Labor Board provides that one
of the prerequisites to the Board's taking jurisdiction is that the parties
shall first resort to procedures provided in a collective bargaining agreement.' A reasonable application of that requirement to the instant case
would seem to demand that the parties first resort to arbitration by the
New York Board of Mediation.' The instant court, however, intimates
that the Department of Labor has power to intervene and that the War
Labor Board may take jurisdiction on its own motion even while the arbitration is pending, and that to deny arbitration is the more practical solution.7 But the court rests most strongly on the war policy argument. To
deny arbitration allegedly saves valuable time and allows for a co-ordinated
national economic policy. However, although there is no direct holding on
this matter by the Board itself, its attitude as revealed by its holdings would
seem to be that those objectives are not best obtained in this manner.'
S- ExEc. ORDER g17, . 3, January x2. x9W, 7 FED. REG. 237: "The procedures
for adjusting and settling labor disputes which might interrupt work which contributes to the effective prosecution of the war shall be as follows: (a) The parties shall
first resort to direct negotiations or to the procedures provided in a collective bargaining agreement. (b) If not settled in this manner, the Commissioners of Conciliation of the Department of Labor shall be notified if they have not already intervened
in the dispute. (c) If not promptly settled by conciliation, the Secretary of Labor shall
certify the dispute to the Board, provided, however, that the Board in its discretion
after consultation with the Secretary may take jurisdiction of the dispute on its own
motion. After it takes jurisdiction, the Board shall finally determine the dispute, and
for this purpose may use mediation, voluntary arbitration, or arbitration under rules
established by the Board."
6. Although the instant court intimated some doubt on the question, the instant
agreement would seem to be a "collective bargaining agreement" within the Executive
Order quoted note S supra. I TELLER, LABoR DxsrTs AND CoEcrivz BARGAINING
(1940) 476: "The collective bargaining-agreement has been variously interpreted, but
its essential nature is the subject of general understanding. It may be broadly defined
as an agreement between a single employer or an association of employers on the one
hand and a labor union upon the other, which regulate the terms and conditions of
employment." Shelley v. Portland Tug and Barge Co., x58 Ore. 377, 38 -386, 76 P.
(2d) 477, 480-481 (1938), in which the decision in Rentscher v. Missouri P. R. Co.,
126 Neb. 493, 253 N. IV. 694, is quoted: "The Court defined the terms 'collective labor
agreement and 'trade agreement' as 'a term used to describe a bargaining agreement
entered into by a group of employees, usually organized into a brotherhood or union,
on one side, and a group of employers, or a corporation, as a railroad company, on the
other side.' The court then stated that such agreement may be a brief statement of
hours of labor and wages or, on the other hand, it may regulate, in the greatest minuteness, every condition under which labor is to be performed. ...
Although most authorities so limit the definition, a contract for future arbitration
of future disputes, such as existed in In re General Motors Corp. and United Automobile Workers of America, io LAB. R1.. RP.

67 (x942) and In re New Orleans

Laundrymen's Club and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, zo LAB. Rm.
REP. 43 (1942), is generally considered a "collective bargaining agreement". Although
the instant case differs in that here there is a contract for future arbitration of an
existing dispute, it is doubtful that any court would argue that such a contract would
not be included within the meaning of that term.
7. "More practical" in the sense that arbitration would probably be a useless
gesture because of probable intervention by the Labor Conciliators or the Board.
Applicable section of the Executive Order is cited note 5 supra.
of Amer& In re General Motors Corporation and United Automobile 'Workers
ica, 1o LAJ. Rn.. REI. 67 (1942), the Board refused jurisdiction: ". . . owing to the
fact that by mutual agreement between the parties the swing-shift is now in operation
is finally
in the General Motors plants under an agreement that whatever rate of pay
that the matdecided upon will be retroactive, and that in view of the union's position
also took the positer was covered by the terms of the existing contrac the companyand
in view of the
tion that it was covered by the terms of the existing contract,
further fact that the dispute has not been submitted for adjustment under the machinery
the
set up under this contract for settlement, this matter tshould) be referred back to

parties to be considered in accordance with the contract now in effectIn re New Orleans Laundrymen's Club and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America, o LA&. Ri. RE. 436 (942),

a contract established a means of settling all
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With the national enforcement agency supporting an antithetical view, the
court's position appears unsupportable on the basis of its own reasoning.'
In addition, there is reason to question the wisdom of the contention that
what would become an over-worked national agency is the most effective
way of obtaining continued, rapid war production.10 While the national
government by the exercise of its war powers can invoke the reserved
rights of the states, it can seriously be questioned whether the power has
been exercised in this instance."
Landlord and Tenant-Discharge of Lease by Induction into
Military Service-Suit by lessor for two months' rent against guarantor on a lease of store premises from 1938 to 1946. Lessee liquidated his
business immediately before induction into the army; rent accrued thereafter. Held: Judgment for defendant. When performance of a contract
is made impossible through a governmental act, the lessee is relieved of his
obligation.to pay rent under the lease.1 Jefferson Estates, Inc. v. Wilson,
35 N. Y. S. (2d) 582 (N. Y. City Cts. 1942).
disputes. The employers considered the contract null and void and refused to establish arbitration machinery. The union claimed that the contracts were still in force
and offered to establish the arbitration tribunal and to submit all disputes to it. The
Board found the contract still in effect and directed them to proceed to settle their dis-

putes within the structure of the existing agreements, using an impartial chairman in
place of a tribunal of three.
9. In view of that fact what weight does the following paragraph, at x6s
of the instant case, carry: "That the Nation is now operating on a war basis is not
debatable. The further deduction is inescapable that our National Economic Policy
should be made to synchronize with our National War Policy, of which it is a component part. The War Labor Board has plenary power in carrying out that policy to
take into consideration the essential interrelationship of military and civil requirements and priorities, government subsidy, maximum prices, profits, taxes, total cost
and any and all pertinent factors that bear upon the adjustment and stabilization of
wages. A process by which wages are fixed by a State agency and the price of the
products of wages by a Federal agency is an administrative anachronism."
But it should be noted that the New York Mediation Board is really not serving
in its "State agency" capacity here. It is simply the arbitrator in a private arbitration
contract. The legal problem would have been the same had the arbitrator been a private individual.
to. The National War Labor Board-ursdctionand Procedure, it INT. JuRiD.
Ass'x BULL. 29 (942): "It is, of course, impossible for the Board to accept and
finally determine any and all disputes. Its limited facilities as well as the necessity
for speed in operation, require some restriction on the cases which will be accepted."
The Board's realization of such a possibility would seem to be shown by decisions
in which jurisdiction is refused for various reasons; for example, In re Municipal Government, City of Newark and State, County and Municipal Workers of America, to
LA. REL. REP. 67 (1942), in which the Board held that the dispute should be settled
by the Commissioners of Newark who were responsible for the administration of the
city.
xt. Mawhinney v. Milbrook Woolen Mills,
231 N. Y. 29A, x32 N. E. 93 (1921),
cited in instant case at 161. In an action to recover damages for breach of contract the
defense was admitted that a War contract with .the Federal Government superseded
the contract and excused performance thereof.
Rosenwasser Brothers, Inc. v. Pepper et a[., 104 Misc. 457, 172 N. Y. Supp. 310
enjoined which the court suggested would not
(x918). A strike in time of War was
ordinarily have been enjoined. "It seems to me that the principles announced in cases
which arose before the War cannot be applied to the relation between workers and employers in War industries, in so far as they conflict with the principles and policies of
the United States government in the conduct of the War."
r. Discharge of the lessee dissolves his guarantor's liability. Adler v. Miles, 69
Misc. 6or, 126 N. Y. Supp. 135 (Sup. CL 1910).
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To alleviate the inequity of enforcing performance of a contract which
has become "impossible"2 the courts have developed the doctrine of disAnd in wartime this doctrine has
charge of contract by impossibility.
peculiar applicability. 4 In the instant case the court decided without discussion that the tenant's duty to pay rent was discharged by his induction
into the army.- Dissolution of lease contracts is difficult to rationalize
within the doctrine of impossibility since the lessee's obligation to pay rent
is generally conditioned only on the continuing availability of the premises.'
Though the old common law rule that destruction of the premises will not
remove this obligation is still predominant,7 where subsequent government
action makes illegal the use to which they had been restricted the contract
is discharged.8 But where the event which caused the impossibility might
have been anticipated, the doctrine of impossibility will not be applied.'
Total, or nearly total destruction of the purpose for which the lease was
intended is necessary.10 However, even where an act of government has
deprived the lessee of the beneficial use of the premises the lessee has been
2. Impossibility is "not only strict impossibility, but impracticability because of
extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss involved." REsTATEM.NT,
CONTRACTS (1932) § 454 It has been observed that the American courts have been
more lenient in applying the doctrine of impossibility than the English courts, construing it as impracticability. Wade, The Principle of Impossibility in Contracts (194o)
56 L Q. REv. 519, 553.
3. "The law of contract is the handmaid of commerce; and the doctrine of the discharge of contract by impossibility is a product of commercial necessity." Wade, loe.
cit. supra note 2, at 519. Necessarily, the courts created convenient fictions to rationnalize the doctrine with existing law: "the implied term" in the contract and the
"fundamental assumption theory", Wade, supra, at 52o; the "frustration of purpose"
theory, Krell v. Henry, [19031 2 K. B. 740. In general see Page, The Development of
the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance (192o) i8 MICH. L REV. 589; Patterson,
Constructive Conditions in Contracts (1942) 42 Cot. L. REv. 903; Wade, loc. cit.
supra note 2; Woodward, Impossibility of Performance as an Excuse for Breach of
Cot L REV. 529.
Contract (190oi)
4. See Pedrick and Springfield, War Measures and Contract Liability (142) 2o
TEx. L REv. 710; McNair, Frustration of Contract by War (i94o) 56 L Q. Rv.
173; Blair, Breach of Contract Due to War (1920) 20 CoL. L REV. 413; McNair, Wartime Impossibility of Performance of Contract (1919) 35 L. Q. REV. 84.
S. The instant decision was based on State Realty Co. v. Greenfield, izo Misc. 27o,
I81 N. Y. Supp. 5it (N. Y. City Cts. i92o), in which a lessee of store premises was
discharged from his lease by induction into the army; this decision appears to be sui
generis in the courts of the United States and England. Sole authority cited in support
of the decision was Adler v. Miles, 69 Misc. 6oi, 126 N.Y. Supp. 135 (Sup. Ct. 19io);
but that case involved impossibility because of subsequent illegality. Thus, the Greenfield decision was evidently dictated by "the sense of the law". Supra at 272, x8i N.
Y. Supp. at 512. It has been held that enlistment in the army is a good defense to a
suit for breach of an employment contract. Marshall v. Glanvill, [19171 2 K. B. 87.
6. Subject, of course, to any express conditions to be performed by the lessor.
7.. PHIsLRfuCK, PROPERTY (1939) 222. But where the leased premises consist of
space in a building subsequently destroyed, the lessee is released from his obligation to
pay rent. Graves v. Berdan, 26 N. Y. 498 (1863). Statutes in some states have abolished the old rule of lessee's liability for rent after destruction of the premises.
6 WmuL!sTox, CONTRACrS (Rev. ed. 1937) § 1955, n. 9.
8. Typical are the saloon cases in which the lessee was discharged by the enactment of prohibitory legislation against the handling of liquor. Greil Bros. Co. v. Mabson, 179 Ala. 444, 6o So. 876 (1912) ; Doherty v. Monroe-Eckstein Brewing Co., 198
App. Div. 708, x91 N. Y. Supp. 59 (ist Dep't, 1921). In the recent case of 6z-69 Pierrepont Street v. Feist, 124 N. J. L. 412, ix A. (2d) 727 (19i4o) the lessee was discharged by a zoning ordinance barring opticians from practicing in that neighborhood.
9. See Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Hoyt, 149 U. S. 1, 14 (1893);
Adler v. Miles, 69 Misc. 6ot, 6o3, 126 N. Y. Supp. 135, 137 (Sup. Ct. 191o).
xo. Adler v. Miles, 69 Misc. 60i, 126 N. Y. Supp. x35 (Sup. Ct. i9o) ; Krell v.
Henry, 119031 2 K. B. 740 (involved here was a license rather than a lease). If other
uses of the premises are permitted by the lease, the lessee will not be discharged.
Conklin v. Silver, 187 Iowa Sg,174.N. W. 573 (1919).
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held obligated to pay rent." Manifestly, the instant decision does not fall
within the authority discharging a lessee when his use of the premises subsequently becomes illegal. 12 It -cannot plausibly be maintained that when the
lessee executed the lease in 1938 he could have anticipated his induction
into the army and expressly provided against it.' 3 On its facts, 14 the decision may be rationalized on the "frustration of purpose" theory: Isthat the
purpose for which the premises were leased was for the operation of a store
business as a proprietorship 6 Neither in America, nor in England have
emergency statutes provided expressly for discharge of leases by induction into the armed forces; ITin the absence of legislative initiative in this
ix. Yellow Cab Co. v. Stafford-Smith Co., 320 11. 294, 35o N. E. 670 (ra6)
(condemnation of part of premises) ; Federal Sign System v. Palmer, 176 N. Y. Supp.

565 (Sup. Ct. igig) (order by Fuel Administrator restricting illumination of leased
signs to Saturday night only); Matthey v. Curling, 11922] 2 A. C. x8o (occupation
of leased premises by military authority) ; London & Northern Estates Co. v. Schlesinger, [3936] x K. B. 2o (alien tenant prevented by Defense of the Realm Act from
occupying premises). But in a recent case a lessee, automobile sales company, was

discharged by the 0. P. A. order halting new car deliveries. Colonial Operating Corp.
v. Hannon Sales & Service, 34 N. Y. S. (2d) it6 (N. Y. City Cts. z942).
12.

The legality of the tenant's store business a-as unaffected by his induction into

the army.

33. The court asserts that "the war" could not have been anticipated by the lessee
in r938. Instant case at 585. But this appears to be irrelevant; for not "the war", but
the lessee's induction into the army was the event to be anticipated.
14. From the amount of rent stipulated in the lease terms it is surmised that the
store business involved was comparatively small; hence, most suitable to a proprietorship. From the allegations in the complaint it appears that the lessee was the sole

proprietor.

r5. ". . . though performance of a promise by one party is still possible according

to its literal terms, facts for which neither party is responsible may prevent that performance from effecting the object or purpose which the parties, when they contracted,

assumed would be effected. There is frustration of this purpose. Generally, it is the
object of only one of the parties that is frustrated, but it is essential in order to preclude a duty on his part, that this purpose is understood by both parties as his basic
purpose in entering into the contract." RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (932) § 454, com-

ment b. See Colonial Operating Corp. v. Hannon Sales & Service, 34 N. Y. S. (2d)
1x6, x22 (N. Y. City Cts. x94z), cited note ii supra.
x6. Following the reasoning in the RESTATEM.ET, op. cit. supra note 15, it may
justifiably be concluded that both parties to the lease understood that the lessee's purpose in leasing the premises was to conduct his own store-business. To compel him to
sub-lease the premises or assign his lease in order to avoid liability may work an unnecessary hardship on the lessee. This sort of facile assumption by the courts is criticized by Professor Patterson, loc. cit. supra note 3, at 950 et seq.
In the instant case the result is based on a sound policy reason: the maintenance
of military morale; this is sufficient justification for the decision. Commenting on proposed amendments to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, note x7 infr, Major
Henry IV. Longfellow asserted that the War Department's interest in their enactment
lay in the salutary effect upon the morale of the Army. Hearings before Committee
on Military Affairs on H. R. 7o2, 77th Cong., ad Sess. (1942) 9. To the same effect
see remarks of Major William D. Partlow, Jr., Judge Advocate General's Department,

id. at 26.

RELIEF AcT,s4 STAT. xi8T, 5o U. S. C. A.
17. See SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIw
§ 530 et seq. (Supp. 1941) ; CouRTs (EMERGENCY PowERs) AcT, L. REP. STAT. (1939)
c. 67, AMEND.. L REP. STAT. (3940) c. 37; LIABILITIES (WVAR-TIME ADJUSTMENT)
Act, L REP. STAT. (3941) C. 24.
Covering precisely the situation here involved, a proposed amendment to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, sponsored by the War Department, was embodied
in H. R. 7029. To Article III of the original Act is to be added Section 304, which
provides in substance that any lease of business or residential premises, executed by or
on behalf of a person who after its execution enters military service, may be terminated by written notice to the lessor any time following induction. S. i569, which
passed the Senate on July 1o. i94!, contained substantially similar provisions.
Major objections levelled at the proposal were that it discarded the ability-to-pay
criterion; that such relief should be given only when it has been demonstrated to the
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direction the courts should be hesitant in extending the frustration of purpose doctrine, as applied to leases, beyond the factual situation presented
by the instant case."s
court's satisfaction that the soldier is unable to meet his obligations; that, as to business leases, it "may seriously retard the financing of improvements to a factory for
war purposes, for any guarantee of rent for the duration of the lease . . .could be
set aside." Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs on H. R. 7o29, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1942) 24, 55. Quotation from comments by Mr. Francis G. Addison, Jr.,
speaking on behalf of the American Bankers' Association. Id.at 5.
Major Partlow in defense of the measure, asserted: "The theory behind this section is that the person in military service is no longer able to enjoy the use of the
property rented under the lease. In other words, he would be paying for something that
he is not getting, no matter how much money he might have . . . to discharge his
obligations under the lease. . . If on account of military service he is not able to
enjoy the use of the property, it seems to me equitable that he should not have to pay
for it." (Citing State Realty Co. v. Greenfield, zzo Misc. 270 181 N. Y. Supm. 5t
(N. Y. City Cts. 192o), cited note 5 supra.) Id. at 25.
18. "In so far as the case-law of frustration of purpose e*tends this implied warranty of fitness of performances other than the sales of goods, it may fulfill a useful,
gap-filling function. In so'far as the excuse of frustration goes beyond this, and re-

lieves a promisor because of fortuitous frustrations of his purpose, it should be, and
generally is, a safety-valve which is moved only by the pressure of war and other
catastrophic events." Patterson, loc. cit. supra note 3, at 954. See Pedrick and Springfield, loe. cit. supra note 4,at 740 e seq.

